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China’s formal accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001 sets the stage for 
sweeping changes in China’s economic and trade system.  Agricultural trade, in particular, will be 
fundamentally changed by the introduction of a tariff rate quota system for China’s imports of many key 
agricultural commodities, including cotton. 
 
The prospect of China’s accession to the WTO last year generated a great deal of excitement among 
cotton merchants anticipating significant imports based on the relatively large cotton import quotas 
proscribed in China’s accession package.  That excitement was, perhaps, overdone as the cotton trade 
searched for any glimmer of goods news that might help to put a bottom on declining world cotton 
prices. 
 
Now that China has actually acceded to the WTO, and is moving, albeit somewhat slowly, to implement 
the new cotton trading system, it is certainly useful to take a look at what China committed to in its 
WTO accession agreement, and what changes have already been made by the Chinese government in 
implementing that agreement.  At the same time as the implementation of the WTO agreement is 
occurring, however, China has also embarked on a significant reform of the domestic cotton pricing, 
marketing and distribution system. 
 
In particular, this paper will look at the February 7 release by China’s State Development and Planning 
Commission (SDPC) of the rules and regulations governing cotton imports under the tariff-rate quota 
(TRQ) system that China committed to implement as part of its WTO accession package.  These rules, 
effective as of February 10, 2002, will be examined from the perspective of what the new rules may 
mean for China’s cotton trade.  And finally, it will discuss the current state of the reform of the domestic 
cotton marketing system and the additional liberalization required under China’s WTO accession 
agreement. 
 
Overview of WTO Accession Agreement 
 
In broad terms, there are three major aspects of China’s WTO agreement that bear directly on trade in 
cotton, including the TRQ system, export subsidies, and domestic distribution rights. 
 
TRQ System.  As most are now aware, China committed to introduce a TRQ system to govern cotton 
imports as part of the WTO accession agreement that was formally signed by China and the WTO 
Secretariat late last year, making China the 143
rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.  China 
agreed to allow imports of 818,500 tons (3,759,303 480-lb bales) in calendar year 2002, rising to 
894,000 tons (4,106,068 bales) in 2004 (table 1).  One-third of this quota is allocated to state trading 
companies and the remaining two-thirds to non-state trading companies. 
 
At the time of its accession to the WTO, China formally notified the Secretariat of four state trading 
enterprises approved to trade in cotton (both un-carded or combed and carded or combed cotton),  China:  Quantities Specified for Cotton TRQ Import System 
     Jan 1  Jan 1  Jan 1 
Item  Unit  2002  2003  2004 
Total TRQ quota level  Tons  818,500 856,250 894,000
   480-Bales  3,759,303 3,932,685 4,106,068
Allocated to non-state traders  Percent  67.0 67.0 67.0
   Tons  548,395 573,688 598,980
   480-Bales  2,518,733 2,634,899 2,751,065
Allocated to state traders  Percent  33.0 33.0 33.0
   Tons  270,105 282,563 295,020
   480-Bales  1,240,570 1,297,786 1,355,002
In-quota tariff  Percent  4.0 4.0 4.0




including the China National Textiles Import and Export Co. (Chinatex), the Beijing Jiuda Textiles 
Group Co., the Tianjing Textiles Industry Supply and Marketing Co., and the Shanghai Textiles Raw 
Materials Co. 
 
Export Subsidies.  Another significant change for cotton trade was China’s commitment to immediately 
cease using export subsidies upon accession to the WTO.  Although perhaps somewhat less prevalent 
than in the grain sector (primarily corn), export subsidies have nonetheless been used regularly by China 
in the past to promote exports of cotton in spite of the significant margin between China’s domestic 
price and the world price.  At times, this has allowed significant quantities of cotton to move onto the 
world market when it otherwise would have been uncompetitive. 
 
Distribution Services.  Another less widely known, but nonetheless significant provision of China’s 
WTO agreement was the commitment to phase in the right to distribute domestically-produced or 
imported products in China within three years of accession.  Prior to accession, China did not permit 
foreign companies to distribute or market cotton, whether that cotton was imported or domestic.  Under 
the WTO agreement, however, this prohibition on cotton distribution and marketing will be phased out 
over three years. Upon accession, foreign-invested enterprises will have the right to distribute and 
provide related services for cotton produced in China.  Within two years after accession, foreign-
invested enterprises will have the right to distribute cotton, whether produced in China or imported, and 
provide related services (storage, etc.).  And within three years, wholly foreign-owned enterprises will 
also have the right to distribute and provide related services for cotton, whether produced in China or 
imported. 
 
Recently Announced Rules for China’s TRQ System 
 
China’s State Development and Planning Commission recently published the final package of rules that 
will govern the cotton TRQ system.  Although the rules as published generally conform to the 
commitments China made in its accession agreement, there are several areas where this is less clearly 
the case. 
 
First, the rules as outlined in the regulation took effect as of February 10, 2002, which is a significant 
delay from the accession agreement, which committed China to actually opening up the cotton import 
quota for use on January 1, 2002.  Therefore, it will likely still be some time until imports are actually 
shipped under the new TRQ system, as the deadline for applications for quota is February 21, and notification of awards of quota to applicants will not be made until early March (with a notification 
deadline of March 5). 
  
Process Summary.  Applications for a cotton quota allocation for 2002 will be accepted from February 
10-21.  Provincial-level offices of the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), who will 
manage the collection of necessary paperwork for the application, will forward “qualified” applications 
to the central SPDC offices in Beijing, who will notify end users of their allocation (if any) by March 5.  
Note that the determination of a “qualified” application rests with province-level officials rather than 
Beijing, potentially opening the door for different interpretations of rules in different provinces. 
 
Quota allocated under the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) will be divided into two types:  Type A, for general 
trade (all imports except for processing trade), and Type B, for processing trade (cotton imported for 
processing and immediate re-export).  End users wishing to apply for a cotton import allocation under 
the quota must first be registered with the State Industry and Commerce Management Authority (as the 
corporate business license must be affixed to the application for an allocation).  In addition, applicants 
must have a “good financial status and tax payment record” (with the relevant data attesting to this for 
2001 attached to the application).  Applicants must also have no record of violations with China’s 
Customs Administration, Quarantine Authority, or Industry and Commerce Department.  And finally, 
applicants must have an annual inspection qualification certificate for 2001. 
 
Assuming the following conditions are all met satisfactorily, the applicants for Type A quota allocation 
(i.e., non-processing trade) must meet at least one of the following criteria in order to be considered for a 
cotton quota allocation: 
 
(1) Be a state-trading enterprise (Chinatex, etc.); 
(2) be a central enterprise that has the authority to hold state cotton reserves; 
(3) be an enterprise that recorded general cotton trade in 2001; 
(4) or be a cotton-spinning mill with the capacity to run at least 50,000 spindles. 
 
If one of these four initial criteria are met which allows an enterprise to apply for quota, then the actual 
allocation of Type A (general trade) quota will be based on an enterprise’s “historical record, processing 
capacity, production, imports, sales, or experience, and the capability of providing services on the 
international market.”  If applications are received for a total amount less than the total amount reserved 
for type A quota for that year, then all of the requests will be fully allocated. 
  
However, if the requests for type A quota exceed the amount allotted, priority will be given to those who 
have an actual history of imports (though not as an “agent”).  Applicants with no history of imports will 
be allocated quota according to their processing capacity and business volume.  Applicants who are 
allocated less than they applied for will receive the full amount requested, while applicants who receive 
an allocation that is less than what is determined to be a minimum or threshold amount (an amount that 
is not identified) will receive no allocation. 
 
Applicants for an allocation of type B quota (processing trade) will also need, in addition to the business 
general business license for all enterprises operating in China, a special “processing license,” issued by 
MOFTEC to apply for the allocation.  They will also then apply for and receive a certificate of 
allocation from the authorized SPDC office in their jurisdiction (province). 
 
Impact of TRQ System on China’s Cotton Trade 
 It is unlikely that China’s cotton imports will be significant during marketing year 2001/02, even if there 
was a significant deficit of cotton (which of course there is not this year given the last bumper harvest).  
First, at least one-third of the normal import period for calendar 2002 will have passed before end-users 
will even receive notification of quota allocation.  This will only leave four months of marketing year 
2001/02 available for imports, and building in time to enlist a trading company, arrange purchase, and 
then transit time, imports are not expected to be significant this marketing year.  USDA is currently 
estimating 400,000 bales of imports, which is not an unreasonable estimate given the current domestic 
surplus and the fact that importers will be navigating a new and untried TRQ system for the first time. 
 
With regard to the TRQ system itself, there are a number of unusual aspects to it that may impact 
China’s cotton imports.  The key aspect is the splitting of the TRQ into two parts, one for so-called 
“general trade” and one for processing trade.  This is an unusual addition to the TRQ system, and 
apparently the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office will be scrutinizing this feature closely to insure that 
it does not act as an impediment to imports.  There are several potential issues with regard to this system 
where the TRQ quota allocation is in part based on the use of the cotton.  For instance, if one quota 
(Type B) is over subscribed but the other (Type A) is under subscribed, is there a process to insure that, 
in total, China’s cotton end users have access to as much of the quota as remains unfilled? 
 
More important, however, is the lack of information regarding the allocation of quota to applicants.  For 
cotton, government or government-related institutions appear to have an advantage in the allocation 
process.  Looking at the criteria for receiving an allocation under the general trade category (Type A), 
three of the criteria favor the state-owned sector:  be a state trading company (Chinatex or one of the 
other three entities identified as state cotton traders), be a central government institution involved in the 
state cotton reserve system, or be an enterprise that imported cotton during 2001.  The first two criteria 
are explicitly targeted at government institutions.  The third, while not appearing to be limited to such, is 
in practical terms largely limited to state-owned yarn mills.  Although data on cotton importers is 
limited, most cotton imports under the old import system were restricted to state-owned companies and a 
small number of joint-venture operations. 
 
The implication of the bias towards state-owned enterprises in terms of accessing cotton quota is that the 
central government has more ability to influence behavior at a state-owned enterprise than it would at a 
private enterprise.  In fact, an unofficial “nudge” from the central government could dissuade, or at least 
minimize, state-owned enterprises from utilizing available cotton quota.  Although government coercion 
in the business sphere is far less than it was a decade or two ago, it nonetheless is present, and, given the 
apparent bias in the rules, could contribute to an under-utilization of available cotton import quota. 
 
In a related provision, the allocation of quota will only be granted if it exceeds an unstated minimum 
amount.  Applications for amounts less than this unspecified minimum would be rejected and the 
applicant would receive no quota.  Again, this provision appears to be an attempt to minimize access to 
the cotton quota of smaller enterprises, which presumably would be attempting to import smaller 
quantities of cotton.  This skews the allocation process towards large, and in most cases state-owned, 
enterprises. 
 
The final criteria that qualifies an end user for a cotton import quota is the capacity to run at least 50,000 
spindles.  While there are many state-owned yarn spinners in China with more than 50,000 spindles, 
there are nonetheless many operations that have less, including the small, largely township and village 
enterprises.  Based on an assumption of 24/7 production for 50 weeks a year, an operation with 50,000 
spindles could consume roughly 50,000 480-lb bales of cotton a year—a significant amount of cotton.  Clearly, a large segment of the potential number of yarn spinners who might wish to import cotton will 
be excluded based on the 50,000-spindle minimum. 
 
In addition, the criteria as published appear to completely exclude all non-state owned non-woven 
operations.  These end users who consume cotton, but do not use spindles in their production process, 
appear to be excluded from applying for cotton quota.  In addition, the regulation also appears to 
exclude operations employing open-end (or rotor) spinning, as these operations also do not utilize 
spindles in the yarn production process.  Although I actually find it highly unlikely that China would 
exclude open-end spinning from quota allocation, it nonetheless appears to be the case because of the 
imprecise language of the regulations. 
 
And finally, assuming that an enterprise is approved to apply for quota, the means of allocating the total 
quota among applicants (assuming it is over subscribed) are at best characterized as murky.  With few 
enterprises importing cotton in 2001, “import history” is not a useful predictor of an allocation.  
Processing capacity, the next criteria on which an allocation will be made, is not explicitly identified in 
the rules.  What are the capacity levels that will be used in making the determination?  Will all 
applicants simply be ranked on capacity and the largest receive quota?  Or will there be stepped ranges?  
Or will some other means be used?  The final means of deciding allocation that is noted in the rules is 
the idea of “business volume.”  However, as with processing capacity, no additional clarification is 
provided, such as how business volume is defined, or what the ranking process might be. 
 
Impact of Liberalization of Cotton Distribution 
 
Over the next three years, China has committed to liberalize domestic marketing and distribution of 
cotton, including related services such as warehousing.  Although China loosened the All-China 
Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperative’s (SMC) monopoly over cotton procurement, 
marketing and distribution system in 1999 and again in 2001, the changes to date have not 
fundamentally changed the cotton procurement or marketing landscape.  Most cotton this year continued 
to be procured (and marketed) by the Cotton and Jute Companies (CJC), although some provinces had 
greater amounts of activity by non-CJC entities.  Practically speaking, CJCs continue to operate as a part 
of the SMC system, although they are now supposed to be “responsible for their own profits and losses.”  
Though even this is less than a hard and fast rule, as it appears China will implement a bailout of 
Xinjiang CJCs, which are sitting on a large amount of unsold cotton purchased at prices above the 
current market price.  The central government will shortly begin purchasing a large quantity of this 
unsold cotton from these enterprises for the national cotton reserve system (though the pricing for these 
purchases is still not known). 
 
This year, Hebei Province appeared to take the lead in the development of a new procurement system, 
with the provincial government authorizing more than 700 companies to procure and market cotton in 
2001/02.  Although many of these companies are simply re-packaged versions of what were once the 
local operations of the Cotton and Jute Company system, others clearly are not.  However, other 
provinces, such as Xinjiang, are moving much more slowly in terms of allowing the government 
controlled system of procurement and marketing enterprises to liberalize. As of late last fall, the 
Xinjiang provincial government has only authorized 28 companies to participate in this year's cotton 
procurement. 
 
And finally, as expected (if not publicized by the central government), some of the new independent 
cotton procurement agents are beginning to go under. Liaoning Province, a relatively minor cotton 
producer (only 6,000 tons in 2000), has already seen some cotton procurement agencies fail. What is not clear, however, is whether these failed agents were newly formed merchants or were part of the Cotton 
and Jute Company system. 
 
As in many other reform programs in China, implementation is occurring unevenly across the country. 
Provinces with more reform-minded governments are taking the lead, while more conservative 
provincial governments are moving slowly, if not actively impeding the reform process in their 
province.  In addition, China’s still tightly state-controlled banking system is proving to be an 
impediment to the liberalization of cotton marketing.  Yarn mills wishing to procure cotton directly from 
farmers are finding that the Commercial and Industrial Bank of China (CIBC), the source of operating 
credits for industry in China, is unwilling to provide credit for the direct purchase of cotton from 
producers, a business activity that the CIBC is unfamiliar with and therefore wary of.  The China 
Agricultural Development Bank, on the other hand, which provides loans to CJCs for cotton 
procurement, are less than enthusiastic about providing credit to yarn mills, an industry with which it has 
had little experience. 
 
Although China has only made modest progress in unilaterally opening up the domestic cotton 
distribution and marketing system, as part of its WTO accession agreement the government committed 
to a full liberalization over the next three years.  Although in the short run, when only domestic cotton 
can be purchases and distributed, the impact on the current system will not be that great.  Therefore, 
over the next year (2002), the current trend of very slow development of an independent cotton 
marketing system will continue.  Although joint venture companies have the right to establish marketing 
operations in China for domestically produced cotton, there is unlikely to be a rush of such enterprises in 
the short term. 
 
In 2003, joint venture companies will have the right to market and distribute domestic or imported 
cotton, and in the next year, this will be extended to wholly foreign owned companies.  I believe that this 
last stage may see the introduction of foreign companies into China’s cotton marketing, which avoids 
the problems that many joint ventures have experienced.  This last step in 2004, then, may see the 
growth of foreign cotton brokers and/or merchants in China.  This would put enormous competitive 
pressures on China’s current cotton marketing enterprises, and would likely accelerate the pace of 
change in the system, perhaps leading to consolidation of the current fractured system and increased 
bankruptcies of poorly run CJC operations. 
 
However the changes progress (fast or slow), the door is now open for the procurement, distribution, 
marketing, and warehousing of cotton by non-state owned, and, eventually, wholly foreign owned, 
companies.  The current system, despite the liberalization that has already been introduced, continues to 
see significant price differentials in different areas of the country for similar grades of cotton.  As more 
efficient (and presumably “hungrier”) independent enterprises enter the cotton market, distribution of 
cotton will improve. 
 
However, there continue to be many impediments to the development of an efficient cotton marketing 
system, impediments that have not so far been addressed in the reforms.  Local cash markets function 
relatively well because buyers and sellers are known to each other and have long-standing relationships.  
However, if local demand exceeds local supply, or vice versa, the mechanisms for selling cotton to or 
sourcing cotton from another province are less effective.  With no system of bearer receipts, which 
would allow cotton lots to be assembled and transferred through intermediaries, mill agents now are 
required to travel to the point of origin to arrange for purchase and transportation. 
 Concluding Ruminations 
 
In the context of the new TRQ system for cotton imports, the lack of an efficient domestic marketing 
system, and an infrastructure to support it (bearer receipts, financing, timely price information, etc.), it 
stands to reason that some mills may turn to foreign imports when local demand outstrips supply.  This 
could occur even when the national cotton supply situation is in surplus as it is now.  However, the 
extent to which this occurs will largely be a function of the new cotton TRQ system—does it effectively 
open up imports to qualified mills or other end users, or is it restrictive and impose unacceptable costs 
on an enterprise seeking imports (whether in terms of the uncertainty of obtaining quota, or an excessive 
expenditure of time and effort in order to obtain quota). 
 
Cotton imports under the new TRQ system are likely to occur relatively quickly, if for nothing else than 
to show the world that the new system is “up and running.”  However, the many ambiguities in the rules 
of the system may well impede the system from operating in a fashion that allows end users to freely 
access imported foreign cotton. 
 
And to the extent that China’s domestic marketing and distribution system remains largely based upon 
the traditional CJC companies, then the inefficiencies in the system will continue to exist—most notably 
relatively wide price gaps between the different regions of the country.  It is likely, then, that enterprises 
located in regions with local shortages will be more willing to incur the “costs” of navigating the TRQ 
system to procure imported foreign cotton.  And with the liberalization of the cotton marketing and 
distribution likely to proceed relatively slowly, even given the additional impetus supplied by the 
changes mandated in the WTO accession agreement with regard to joint venture or wholly foreign 
owned entrants into the system, this may well be a significant driver of imports over the next few years. 
 
However, predictions of import behavior by China tend to be wrong just about as often as they are right.  
It remains to be seen how the new TRQ system will operate, and to what extent the government seeks to 
or is successful in manipulating it to meet its own policy goals.  However, over the medium term, and 
perhaps as early as 2002/03, the TRQ system will likely begin to operate much more smoothly and as 
originally envisioned by those who negotiated it, even if only through challenges in Geneva for breaches 
of the agreement. 
 
Once that occurs, the question then becomes how China’s farmers will respond to world price signals as 
transmitted through imports.  Although farmers in China are certainly going to respond to price signals, 
what is less certain is the competitive advantage of the different crops in China vis-à-vis foreign 
producers.  China is also liberalizing grain trade through a TRQ system, and if these crops are even less 
competitive than cotton, then farmers could well shift more area into cotton as the lesser of two evils.  
This “fallout” among China’s different crops, based on relative prices, will be very important to how 
much or how little China needs to turn to cotton imports to make up for any reduction in domestic 
production. 
 
The bottom line, therefore, is that China will likely import 75,000-100,000 tons this marketing year, far 
less than the upper bound set by the quota.  Imports in 2002/03 are much less certain, and any projection 
of trade will need to take into account how well the TRQ system operates this year (whether allowing or 
impeding imports) and how cotton fares in the overall structural adjustment that will be occurring as 
China’s farmers come to terms with the impact of increased trade in many of China’s major crops. 
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sWhat Does WTO Accession  What Does WTO Accession 
Mean for China’s Cotton Trade? Mean for China’s Cotton Trade?
l Examine new trading rules
l Envision how practical application of those 
rules may proceed
l Speculate on impact on China’s cotton trade 
over the short and medium termTimeline Timeline
l China accedes to WTO on December 14, 
with implementation of commitments to 
take effect on January 1, 2002.
– Tariff-rate quota system for cotton imports
– Cotton export subsidies banned
– Domestic cotton marketing and distribution 











4.1 mil bales 
until there is 
another round 
of negotiationsTariff Rate Quota System Tariff Rate Quota System
l Up to 818,500 tons in CY2002 at 1%
– Above quota tariff at 54.5 %
– Two-thirds of quota to non-state trade, 
remaining one-third to state trade
– Quota rises to 894,000 tons in 2004
l Above quota tariff declines to 40 %
– Unused state quota reallocated by Oct 1Export Subsidies Export Subsidies
l China committed to end use of all cotton 
export subsidies upon accession
– Successfully used in past, most recently to 
promote exports of Xinjiang cotton
– VAT rebates, if do not exceed actual VAT rate, 
will likely continue as they do not seem to 
come under this provisionDistribution Services Distribution Services
l Phase in rights to cotton distribution over 
three years
– Year 1: Foreign invested ventures may 
distribute domestic cotton
– Year 2: Foreign invested ventures may 
distribute domestic or imported cotton
– Year 3: All ventures, including wholly foreign 
owned, may distribute cotton from all sourcesRules for TRQ Cotton Imports Rules for TRQ Cotton Imports
l Apply for quota Feb 10-21
l Notified of allocation by Mar 5
– Significant delay from Jan 1 start
– Factor in enlisting trade company, arranging 
purchase, and transit time, first TRQ imports 
may not land until early April
– One-fourth of calendar year gone, and only four 
months of MY 2001/02 remainingChina Imposes Surprise Rule China Imposes Surprise Rule
l Quota and application process split between 
“general trade” and “processing trade”
– May be a problem in future if impedes trade
– How balance allocation if one type is over-
subscribed and other is under-subscribed
– Language in rules for process trade access to 
quota very unclear, difficult to assess impactCriteria to Determine if End  Criteria to Determine if End 
Users May Apply for Quota Users May Apply for Quota
l To be able to apply for quota, must meet at 
least one of the following criteria:
– State-trading company (Chinatex, etc.)
– Central government enterprise that can hold 
state cotton reserves
– Imported cotton in 2001
– A yarn mill with more than 50,000 spindlesAllocation of Quota Allocation of Quota
l Allocation principles in order of precedence
– End users with a “history of imports”
– “Processing capacity and business volume”
– Additional factors impacting allocation:
l “production, sales, experience, capability of 
providing services on the international market”
– Allocations below an unstated “threshold” will 
not receive any quotaImplications of the Application  Implications of the Application 
Criteria? Criteria?
l Notable bias towards state-enterprises…
– State cotton trading company
– Gov’t institution holding state cotton reserves
– History of imports…if gauge is 2001, few meet 
criteria as imports only 230,000 bales, and 
primarily are state-owned mills (some JVs)
– 50,000+ spindle mill….only larger mills 
qualify, again mostly state-owned enterprisesHow Many Mills Qualify? How Many Mills Qualify?
l Unable to research numbers, but likely not a 
large share of the total universe of China’s 
yarn mills
– 50,000 spindles running 12/7 for 50 weeks, 
means consume roughly 25,000 bales a year
– Excludes township and village spinning 
operations
– An important limiting factor…will this promote 
consolidation in future?What is Not Mentioned… What is Not Mentioned…
l Spindle language is confusing… 
– Does this exclude all non-woven enterprises?
– What about open-end spinners who don’t have 
spindles?
– Spindles “registered,” but underreporting 
rampant to avoid gov’t drive to reduce capacity
l Wiggle room for gov’t, or just an oversight?
l Excludes foreign firms w/out a yarn millDistribution Services Distribution Services
l China must allow foreign-funded 
enterprises to compete in the cotton 
marketing and distribution system
l System already in flux with two unilateral 
rounds of liberalization (1999 and 2001) of 
SMC/CJC systemCurrent State of Distribution Current State of Distribution
l Mixed picture depending on province
– Hebei officials more aggressive, approved over 
700 firms to participate in procurement and 
marketing, though many are simply repackaged 
versions of CJCs
– Xinjiang approved less than 30 enterprises
l Many impediments to moving into this 
business…particularly access to creditImpact of Distribution Reform Impact of Distribution Reform
l In short order (3 years), China’s domestic 
cotton marketing system is likely to be 
faced with wholly foreign-owned 
competitors….perhaps some of the larger 
U.S. merchants
l Current system relatively weak and 
fractured
– Lack of credit, overstaffed, etc.Implications of WTO for  Implications of WTO for 
China’s Cotton Trade China’s Cotton Trade
l USDA currently estimating 400,000 bales 
of imports in 2001/02
l Some imports likely to occur very quickly, 
if only for PR reasons
l Unlikely to see big volumes this mktg year
– Delay in establishing TRQ system
– Navigate a Byzantine and untried TRQ systemReal Question is 2002/03 Real Question is 2002/03
l Birthing pangs of new system over?
– Cotton production may fall 15-20 percent as 
recent intentions survey suggest
– But large stock overhang from 2001/02 unless 
consumption growth stays high
– Imports likely above this year, but not reaching 
TRQ limitSo Many Questions…. So Many Questions….
So Few Answers So Few Answers
l A more realistic projection of imports under 
the new TRQ system in 2002/03 must wait 
for the system to actually function
l Important questions remain…
– Non-mill sector access to quota
– Allocation principle not clearly definedOne Person’s WAG… One Person’s WAG…
l In 2002/03, total imports could rise to 
between 1.5 and 2 million bales
– Assume at least 10 percent decline in output, 
and continued growth in offtake
– Optimistic?…rules may limit access to TRQ
– Impact of plan to purchase for state reserves?
– Need see TRQ system actually operate for a 
while